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Abstract There is traditionally a division of labor between economics and eco-
nomic history, the task of economic history being that of studying the evolving
constraints of economic mechanisms. Recent theorizing on endogenous structural
change challenges this view: if structural change is endogenous to economic mech-
anisms, any strict division of labor between causal analysis and structural analysis
breaks down. Rather such views call for an integration of causal and structural
analysis. This paper looks for such a methodology, noting especially the contri-
butions made by two Swedish economists, Johan A˚kerman (1896-1982) and Erik
Dahme´n (1916-2005). With evolutionary, Marxian, Hayekian and critical realist
contributions, the paper examines notions of endogenous structural change with
the aim of expounding how the notion can be thought in terms of underlying
mechanisms to aid such structural analysis. The findings of endogenous mecha-
nisms underlying structural change are crystallized into a mathematical model
and a simple methodological framework.
Keywords endogenous structural change, causality, economic methodology,
emergence
1 Introduction
Causal inference in historical and complex systems is one of the core methodolog-
ical issues of the social sciences. The problem is well-known: what are we to make
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of causality when the study object does not allow us to isolate causes and effects
in controlled and repeatable experiments? The main problem facing the social sci-
entist is to disentangle causal relations from the web of relations that make up
complex systems. Most methodological contributions to these issues explicitly or
implicitly point towards notions of structure and stability as being integral to iso-
late and delineate causal relations in complex systems. In open complex systems,
causal mechanisms presuppose structural stability, the caeteris paribus or some set
of auxiliary assumptions. Accordingly, empirical approaches to causality tacitly or
explicitly presuppose structural stability that allows recurrent causal relations to
be expressed. This is commonly the analytical function that the notion of structure
obtains in economics, history and other disciplines in the social sciences. Structure
is then a reified fact, the theatre on which agents play their roles.
With such a notion it is not surprising that the conjoint study of structural
change, i.e. changes in institutions, technology, production etc., are typically not
directly involved in causal analysis. As it were, one cannot both hold things con-
stant and analyze their change. Rather, as regards economics, a commonly held
view is that there is a division of labor between economics and economic history.
If economics is the study of general laws and mechanisms – whether in theoretical
models or econometric applications - the role of economic history is to provide his-
torical accounts and perhaps even theories of structural stability (periodizations)
and structural change. Or, as Douglass North phrased it, ”It certainly should be
the distinctive province of the economic historian to theorize about the evolution
of constraints that determine the structure of economies”, even adding that ”until
we do undertake this task, I see no reason for economists to take us seriously”
(North, 1978, p. 78). In this view, structural analysis is thus a complementary
facet of causal analysis, enabling an understanding of the boundaries of causal
mechanisms and general laws in economics (as it is elsewhere).
If we are to subscribe to the view that structural analysis is a necessary com-
plement to causal analysis, we are however confronted with a second issue: What
is in fact meant with the ubiquitous word ”structure” and how do structures relate
to choices made by economic agents? As the intellectual history of the notion re-
veals, thinking ”structure” is fraught with several issues, one of which concerns the
relation between agency and structure – or the micro-macro problem. A related
issue concerns the endogeneity (or exogeneity) of structural change to economic
mechanisms. Two polar positions on structure are traditionally recognized. In a
reductionist view, ”structures” are short-hand notions to denote an aggregate of
some properties, choices or behavior of individuals, which exhibits some degree
of inertia. Conversely, in realist views, structures are ontologically emergent viz.
irreducible in principle to lower-level phenomena.
Both these views are problematic. If structure is explicable in terms of agency or
if structure determines agency, structure and agency are merely points in the same
process and structural change is rendered exogenous by definition to the system of
thought or the mechanism under consideration. Is structural change, for instance
changes in technology or institutions, really exogenous to economic behavior? This
issue has encouraged attempts to re-invent the notion of structure and the relation
between agency and structure. In economics, especially in recent years, several
contributions, e.g. in the economics of complexity and evolutionary economics (see
e.g. Arthur et al, 1997; Antonelli et al, 2008), post-keynesian economics (Pasinetti,
1983) and in contributions to institutional theory (see Greif and Laitin, 2004) have
Causality and Endogenous Structural Change in Economics and History 3
sought to explain the emergence of structure and structural change as a result of
economic behavior, while still accounting for an influence of macro-structure on
economic or other choices. Thus structures are considered to constrain or support
agency while at the same time evolving as a result of economic behavior.
There are however two challenges to such notions of endogenous structural
change. Apparently, such a notion has radical corollaries to our view of the mutual
independence of causal and structural analysis: if structural change is endogenous
to economic mechanisms, any strict division of labor between causal analysis and
structural analysis, between economics and economic history, breaks down. Struc-
tural change becomes as much an object of inquiry into economic behavior and
economic mechanisms as it is of exogenous driving forces. Thus, as I will argue, it
appears that this view requires causal and structural analysis to be integrated. Not
only is structural analysis then a prerequisite for causal analysis, but the question
becomes how to empirically observe and analyse structural stability and change.
A second intellectual challenge is that there appears to be something self-
defeating about a notion of endogenous structural change. Is it not an oxymoron
of sorts? How can structures change as a result of factors endogenous to them? Or
going deeply into matters: how can there be endogenous novelty in a theoretical
system, as with Wittgenstein ”there can never be surprises in logic” (Wittgenstein,
2001 [1922], 6.125)?
In light of these issues, the current paper aims to do two things. First, this
paper studies the points of contact between economic and economic historical
analysis through a study of notions of causality, structure and structural change.
How could the analysis of causal mechanisms be integrated with a conjoint study
of changes in underlying structures? The paper begins therefore with discussing
the issue of how causal analysis and structural analysis can be integrated. This
section especially notes and makes use of the critical and constructive contributions
to structural analysis made by two Swedish economists, Johan A˚kerman (1896-
1982) and Erik Dahme´n (1916-2005), who have played a salient role in Swedish
economic history as a discipline (see e.g. Scho¨n, 2010). Being one of the earliest
Swedish institutionalists alongside Gunnar Myrdahl, Johan A˚kerman’s project was
largely that of introducing history into economics, thus providing a bridge between
economics and economic history. He criticized notions of structure in economic and
historical analysis for providing insufficient ground for proper economic causal
analysis and developed a methodology for the empirical analysis of structure and
structural change. Erik Dahme´n further developed A˚kerman’s structural analysis
towards a notion of endogenous structural change, especially through his concept
of development blocks (Dahme´n, 1991 [1942], 1950; Scho¨n, 1991, 2010; Erixon,
2011).
Second, the paper examines the notion of endogenous structural change with
the aim of expounding how the notion is thought and can be thought in terms of
underlying mechanisms in order to aid empirical analysis of evolving structures.
In section 3, I deal with the question of how notions of endogenous structural
change can be thought, through a brief review of recent theorizing on the notions
of structure and structural change in the economics of complexity, evolutionary,
Hayekian, critical realist and Marxian theories. The findings are crystallized into a
simple mathematical model of endogenous structural change. The paper concludes
by summarizing the discussion and a reflection on empirical study of the evolution
of economic and social structures.
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2 Towards an integration of causal and structural analysis
It could seem a hopeless task to try to make sense of two so ubiquitous and
commonsensical words as are causality and structure. Yet, these words open up
worlds: what meaning one puts in them tells us of underlying ontologies or onto-
epistemologies about how we perceive inter-relations between phenomena. More
importantly, these notions are interrelated. In this section, I will try argue that on-
tological positions on causality in mainstream economic theory have engendered
certain approaches towards structural analysis. Essentially, there are two possi-
ble ones: either structural stability is implicitly assumed as a prerequisite of the
expression of causal mechanisms but ultimately ”exogenized”, or it is explicitly
incorporated as a facet of causal mechanisms, thus making the causal analysis
inseparable from structural analysis.
2.1 Causality and structure in closed systems
It is well known that the dominant notions of causality finds its intellectual roots
in Hume’s empiricist and atomist philosophy. Causality is understood as the con-
stant conjunction of a cause A with the effect B, where the cause is antecedent to
the effect. Hume’s epistemological view of causation was rooted in an ontological
atomism, attested in ”All events seem entirely loose and separate” (Hume, 2011
[1748], Section II). Thus, Hume denounced the possibility of direct observation of
certain relations between objects: ”The simple view of any two objects or actions,
however they are related, can never give us any idea of power or of a connection be-
tween them” (Hume, 2012 [1738]). Causality is thus always, at best, a hypothesis,
an observation of repeated occurrence of a cause A with an effect B.
It is possible to argue (see e.g. Bhaskar, 2008 [1975], Lawson, 1997 and Moneta,
2005) that Humean notions of causality have primarily induced empirical strategies
that center on reproducing closed systems or observing constant conjunctions. As
noted by Hoover (2001, 2008) and Moneta (2005), the probabilistic approach to
causality is a canonical econometric successor of the Humean view. Granger’s
(1969) hugely influential concept of causality relies on a simple notion of causality,
namely that A causes B if P (B|A) > P (B) and A occurs before B. Clearly, this
is a generalization of Hume’s requirements of constant conjunctions of events and
the antecedence of cause to the effect, which could be restated as ”A causes B if
P (B|A) = 1, P (B) = 0 and A occurs before B”. An extension of this definition
was given by Granger (1980), according to which what is now commonly called
Granger causality holds between a variable X and Y if in the equation Yt =∑L
k (βt−kYt−k + βt−kXt−k) + t, with lag length L, βt−k 6= 0 for some k. Thus,
X Granger causes Y if, controlling for the previous information on Y , X has a
(positive or negative) effect.
Another attractive methodological alternative lies in natural experiments: ex-
periments where causes and effects can be isolated, by ”nature” giving two cases
similar in all aspects but the fact that one has been treated, the other not.1 A
1 An archetypal example might be West and East Germany, giving a test of the effects of their
respective economic systems during the postwar period. Natural experiments must however be
random, double-blind and free of omitted variable bias, which imposes a problem of finding
good natural experiments. In comparing the impact of the economic systems of West and East
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similar alternative, pioneered by P.G. Wright in 1928, is the instrumental variable
approach that has become widespread in recent years (see Angrist and Krueger,
2001 for a review).2
These methodological approaches to causal analysis appear to presuppose no-
tions of structure (stability) as exogenous to economic mechanisms. There are two
ways in which structure is introduced in neoclassical economics:
– as caeteris paribus. An exogenous state of affairs unaffected by the causal mech-
anisms under study, or a set of assumptions of other things being equal that
in practice imply ignoring ”the element of time”.3
– as equilibrium. The endogenous outcome of the causal mechanism under con-
sideration, which however upon being attained can never be superseded by
factors endogenous to the causal mechanism under consideration.
It is on these terms that the job of the economic historian, the study of the
”evolution of constraints” can be separated from causal analysis proper. However,
these notions clearly run counter to the idea of endogenous structural change. Some
of the more familiar criticisms towards these approaches have been advanced by
Nicholas Kaldor (Kaldor, 1972) and Joan Robinson (1962, 1980). Kaldor remarked
that ”The very notion of ’general equilibrium’ carries the implication that it is le-
gitimate to assume that the operation of economic forces is constrained by a set of
exogenous variables which are ’given’ from the outside and stable over time” and
that in such a framework ”Continuous economic change [...] can only be conceived
as some kind of ’moving equilibrium’ through the postulate of an autonomous (and
unexplained) time-rate of change in the exogenous variables of a kind that is con-
sistent with ’continuous equilibrium’ through time-such as a given rate of shift per
unit of time in the production function of the so-called ’ Harrod-neutral’ type or in
the supply of resources: an exogenous rate of growth in the labour force and/or in
the rate of increase in ’capital’ [...]” (Kaldor, 1972, p. 1244). Less familiar, but in
a similar fashion, Johan A˚kerman (see below) argued that as a concept for struc-
tural analysis in historical settings, equilibrium or ”l’ordre naturel” was directly
Germany on their respective growth rates (or similar), their division must be ascertained to
be random, and there cannot be latent variables such as the industrial conglomorate in the
Ruhr area may well be).
2 The approach is aimed to resolve, inter alia, the problems of reverse causality (viz. endo-
geneity) and omitted variables by finding exogenous instruments, i.e. variables that are strongly
correlated with an independent variable but not with the dependent variable. The approach is
carried out by first regressing an independent variable X on a suitable instrumental variable
Z that is plausibly exogenous and uncorrelated with all other independent variables. Then
the effect of Z on the dependent variable Y can be estimated. The approach is capable of
isolating the effect of the hypothesized dependent variable regardless of whether the model has
omitted variables in general. However, the omitted variables must not be correlated with the
instrument.
3 As was expressed by Alfred Marshall, the ”element of time is a chief cause of those difficul-
ties in economic investigations which make it necessary for man with his limited powers to go
step by step; breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time, and at last combining
his partial solutions into a more or less complete solution of the whole riddle. In breaking it up,
he segregates those disturbing causes, whose wanderings happen to be inconvenient, for the
time in a pound called Caeteris Paribus. The study of some group of tendencies is isolated by
the assumption other things being equal: the existence of other tendencies is not denied, but
their disturbing effect is neglected for a time. The more the issue is thus narrowed, the more
exactly can it be handled: but also the less closely does it correspond to real life” (Marshall,
2009, p. 180).
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unsuitable, a fiction, in which ”there is no place for systematic structural change”,
nor endogenous systematic variations such as the business cycles (A˚kerman, 1939,
pp. 263-264; translation of quotes by JT). Thus, upon being attained equilibrium
can never be superseded by factors endogenous to the causal mechanism under
consideration, rather they must stem from the exogenous realm.
Clearly, if changes in production, technologies and institutions are endogenous
to economic mechanisms, one must look for ways of transcending the division of
labor between causal and structural analysis. This would also encourage rethink-
ing both approaches to the observation of causal mechanisms and the notion of
structure.
2.2 Causal ontologies in open systems
There are causal ontologies that carry some way towards such a transcendence.
Against Humean atomism, there is a commonly repeated intuition among those
who would point to the importance of context, history and structure, to say that
events, agents and variables do not exist in isolation. Some notions of causality
attempt to explicitly deal with the complexity of open systems (Bhaskar, 2008
[1975]; Lawson, 1997), encouraging the conjoint study of economic structures head
on in order to understand the conditions of validity of the causal mechanism.
Such onto-epistemologies imply that, rather than the atom, the fundamental onto-
epistemological unit is the relation between phenomena. Relations thus precede the
relata, implying that the relata emerge through the process in which they become
related. This means that events and processes are always already immersed in
spatio-temporal causal structures that govern the state of affairs.
One of the main approaches along such lines, Bhaskar’s critical realist project
emerged as a critique both of Hume’s classical empiricism as well as Kant’s tran-
scendental idealism, both of which seriously question our ability to observe causal
connections between events. On the contrary, Bhaskar is an example of ontolog-
ical realism about causality. Bhaskar (2008 [1975]) in particular argues that the
constant conjunction of events is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
scientific or causal laws. Instead, Bhaskar argues that in experimental activity,
the researcher is a causal agent of a sequence of events, but not of the causal law
that the experiment allows him or her to identify. Causal laws must, for science
to be possible, exist independently of scientific activity. In this view, the object
of scientific research is knowledge of generative mechanisms, viz. causal structures
that are irreducible to the phenomena that they generate: ”The world consists of
mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms combine to generate the flux of phe-
nomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world” (Bhaskar,
2008 [1975], p. 47). However, ”it is only under closed conditions that there will
be a one-to-one relationship between the causal law and the sequence of events”
(Bhaskar, 2008 [1975], p. 46). In open systems, generative mechanisms may be at
work, but counteracted by other generative mechanisms. This forces researchers to
reconsider causality as, not a constant conjunction of events, but rather, generative
mechanisms, that may, or may not, be activated or manifested. To Bhaskar, the
task becomes to discover generative mechanisms through analysis of structures.
Lawson (1989) has argued that Keynes view and macroeconometric approaches
express such a realist concern about causality because of the implausibility of the
Causality and Endogenous Structural Change in Economics and History 7
atomist view and since societies and economies are typically open systems. Simi-
larly, the structuralist approach in econometrics implied the study of systems of
interdependent variables, attacking the intriguing question of what becomes of
causality in systems where all variables are interdependent (Haavelmo, 1944; Si-
mon, 1953; Simon and Rescher, 1966). In face of the puzzle of how to identify stable
relations in interdependent systems, Haavelmo (1944) argued for distinguishing
autonomous relations, i.e. relations which are invariant under different circum-
stances. A particular system of behavioristic relations and institutional restrictions
on choices defined a particular structure, ”a theoretical set of possible simultaneous
sets of value or sets of time series for the economic variables” (Haavelmo, 1944,
p. 28). Thus, if there is a certain relation that is invariant with respect to a set
of different structures one may say that the relation is autonomous with respect
to a class of structures. While Haavelmo considered the task of economics to be
to find out of such autonomous relations4, he also argued that when facing exoge-
nous changes that affect the autonomous relations, if ”we cannot clear the data of
[...] ’other influences,’ we have to try to introduce these influences in the theory,
in order to bring about more agreement between theory and facts” (Haavelmo,
1944, p. 18). Haavelmo did not discuss how structural change could be included in
models. However, this passage points towards an explicit structural analysis as an
activity conjoint to the search for generic autonomous relations among variables.
2.3 The case for structural analysis
The realist perspectives on causality carry some way towards merging causal with
structural analysis. However, if we accept that not only structure, but also struc-
tural change should be studied head on as a part of causal analysis, we run into an
opposite problem: how can structures and structural change be studied empirically
as a facet of economic historical analysis? The main issues at hand are then:
– How can the divide between causal analysis and the study of structural change
be bridged?
– What types of endogenous mechanisms underlie structural change and stability
and how can they be studied empirically?
I will approach these questions in sections 2.4 and 2.5, by introducing and
reviewing two examples of empirical approaches that integrate causal and struc-
tural analysis, pointing towards the study of structural change as endogenous to
economic mechanisms. These are Johan A˚kerman’s ”causal analytical” notion of
structure and Erik Dahme´n’s notion of ”development blocks”. Like many others
with an institutionalist inclination, both A˚kerman and Dahme´n emphasized not
only the study of structural stability, but structural change as an integral part
of causal analysis. What is rare about these frameworks is however that they are
examples of theoretical and methodological attempts to transcend the division of
labor between economics and economic history, while also being focused on empir-
ical application in economics and economic history. Though their empirical work
was focused on economic development and industrial transformation, in reviewing
4 ”The principal task of economic theory is to establish such relations as might be expected
to possess as high a degree of autonomy as possible” (Haavelmo, 1944, p. 29).
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these frameworks, I hope also to indicate what is unique and generalizable beyond
economic applications in their methodologies.
2.4 Causal structural analysis. The example of A˚kerman’s economic methodology
Inspired by Thorstein Veblen, Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich von Hayek, A˚kerman
was next to Gunnar Myrdahl one of the earliest and most influential Swedish insti-
tutionalists (see Mjøset 1994, P˚alsson Syll 1997, Carlson 1999 and Erixon 2011).
A˚kerman can be placed fairly close to the critical realist views as concerns their
basic outlook of structure and society, harboring a critical attitude towards ”atom-
ism”, A˚kerman being dubbed as ”holist” (Nyble´n, 1949). This implied that he saw
as a central aspect of economic theory as understanding the shifting material
and institutional setting in which economic processes take place. Delimiting struc-
tures and understanding the driving forces of structural change was the purpose
of A˚kerman’s structural analysis. A˚kerman distinguished sharply between ”mod-
els of calculation”, rationalisations of the calculations of subjects, and a ”causal
analysis” aiming to reconstruct the total economic process and to understand and
predict its development (A˚kerman, 1939, p. 9). In A˚kerman’s view, both causal
analysis and models of calculation are temporally localized, i.e. only valid as long
as a particular economic structures is at hand, which for A˚kerman motivated
structural analysis.
A basic definition of structure was given by A˚kerman at one occasion as a
”within given temporal boundaries, the structural boundaries, rather stable eco-
nomic mechanism” (A˚kerman, 1949, p. 1; translation by JT). This immediately
points at a venue for empirical analysis. Structural boundaries, i.e. the temporal
boundaries of certain stable economic mechanisms, could according to A˚kerman
be observed through the empirical analysis of the trends and turning points of
”structural indicators”, such as the the distribution of income and credit on the
private and public sector and the distribution of income on industries (A˚kerman,
1939, 1949).5
However, against other static, dynamic or ”purely historical” concepts of struc-
ture, A˚kerman stressed a causal analytical concept of structure. To explain this
concept, A˚kerman likened economic analysis to an analysis of a game of pool.
Given a set of initial conditions, one may calculate the alternate ways a set of
billiard balls came to end up in given positions. This is an astructural analysis.
Asking instead what causal factors that determined the direction and force of the
strike chosen, takes the analysis outside of the pool table and is analogous to a
structural analysis. Structures determine the dominating causal factors (A˚kerman,
1939, p. 265). This notion of structure also necessitates an understanding of the
causes of structural change and an incorporation of this structural analysis into
the analysis of economic theory:
”To formulate an economic theory, which suits a certain temporally and spa-
tially localized reality, one must thus know the structural framework in which
5 Several other indicators have later been used by economic historians as structural indi-
cators, e.g. the ratio of domestic investments to GDP and the ratio of Paasche to Laspeyres
price indices, known as the ’Gerschenkron effect’ on the basis of which periods of structural
stability have been distinguished. See e.g Scho¨n (1998, 2010).
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the activity takes place. But this means, that one knows something of the struc-
tural changes and the causal connections that operate in this sphere. Knowl-
edge of the economic principles are thus dependent on knowledge of structural
changes; the questions, which are described in models of calculation stand in
a relation of interdependence to the process described in causal analysis. The
logical models of calculation rest on a foundation that is continuously chang-
ing; it is not sufficient to know the foundation in one particular case - one must
also research the laws of structural change. The concept of economic structure
therefore can never denote anything else but a relativistic reality: the posi-
tion of a certain structure in relation to previous and subsequent structures,
by which the concept becomes an instrument in the search of the forces that
govern structural changes” (A˚kerman, 1939, p. 262; translation by JT).
I should like to emphasize how, as the lengthy quote suggests, A˚kerman’s project
implied the mutual dependency between structural analysis and causal analysis. The
calculation models and causal analysis crucially implied a structural determina-
tion, a ”spatio-temporally localized reality”, while at the same time the structural
analysis has a decidedly relativistic and therefore causal core. Structural analy-
sis thus also means to seek an understanding of the driving forces of structural
change. In nuce, causal structural analysis consists not only of a description of
causal mechanisms but also the evolution of causal mechanisms through analysis
of structural change and its driving forces.
A˚kerman (1944, pp. 27-28) clarified that such search for driving forces is a
process, one is temped to say an iterative process, in which ostensibly closed sys-
tems (”skenbart slutna sammanhang”) are connected to forces exogenous to the
particular mechanism (just as the analysis was moved outside of the pool table
in the previous example), which in its turn forms a new ostensibly closed system
whose structural changes can be understood by repeating the process.6 Expressed
otherwise: ”The mechanism’s open moment is the subject of causal analysis and one
seeks to localize these to connect them with in relation to the mechanism ex-
ogenous driving forces, which in their turn stand in a temporally interdependent
relationship” (A˚kerman, 1944, p. 28, translation by JT, original emphasis).
A˚kerman demonstrably understood causal analysis as finding exogenous driv-
ing forces, being entirely distinct from endogenous interdependence (A˚kerman,
1960, p. 284-287). By beginning with a closed system, one could approach a wider
picture of the driving forces of structural changes by researching the ”open mo-
ment”. Prima facie, this methodological understanding of causality is similar to
Schumpeter’s methodological outlook. The early Schumpeter stated: ”When we
succeed in finding a definite causal relation between two phenomena, our problem
is solved if the one which plays the ”causal” roˆle is non-economic. We have then
accomplished what we, as economists are capable of in the case in question, and
we must give place to other disciplines. If, on the other hand, the causal factor is
itself economic in nature, we must continue our explanatory efforts until we ground
6 ”The concept driving force becomes in causal analysis of fundamental importance. In
this concept [...] lies a standpoint towards the nature of causality, to the connection between
pure economic mechanism and exogenous factors. With the notion driving force the causal
explanation is moved outside of the analyzed process, it is not sought in the factors’, even
less the concepts’, logical interplay. The causal explanation is thus successively driven from
one ostensibly closed system to an other ostensibly closed system and from there to another
ostensibly closed proces, etc.” (A˚kerman, 1944, pp. 27-28, translation by JT).
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upon a non-economic bottom” (Schumpeter, 1911, pp. 4-5). However, by adding
an ”etcetera” to the causal analytical process (see footnote), A˚kerman insinuated
that the search for exogenous driving forces could in principle continue well be-
yond economic mechanisms, forming a new ostensibly closed system. Thus, it is
through the successive incorporation of exogenous driving forces that structural
change could be analyzed.
In his analysis of economic development of leading industrialized countries
1820-1940, A˚kerman pointed out eight possible driving forces to structural change,
e.g. technological development, population increases, the development of the credit
system and the distribution of income. These factors were viewed as exogenous,
but not exclusively. Rather A˚kerman considered their status vis-a`-vis the economic
mechanism to vary over the course of (say) a business cycle. Thus A˚kerman dis-
tinguished between ”free” driving forces, in statu nascendi and ”bounded” driving
forces, those that have been active but ”now crystallized in the current order”
(A˚kerman, 1944, p. 41, JTs translation). These bounded driving forces would with
the ’structural heritage’ from previous development form a new structure, while
the actual process of structural change is the result of ”contact and conflict be-
tween new, free, driving forces and the extant structure or institutions, such as
these have emerged from the actions of previous driving forces” (A˚kerman, 1944,
p. 41, JTs translation).
In sum, structural analysis in A˚kerman’s approach thus involved two comple-
mentary modes of analysis, which I will refer to as M1 and M2:
M1: the determination of structural boundaries, stable economic mechanisms, pri-
marily through the analysis of structural indicators, and
M2: the analysis of the driving forces of structural change.
2.5 Causal mechanisms in endogenous technological change. Dahme´n’s approach
The previous two points serve as apt starting points of an integration of causal and
structural analysis. However, the structural analysis of A˚kerman does not specify
mechanisms whereby new structures emerge, are stabilized or transformed. The
second question is thus posed in the domain of economic history: what mechanisms
create, reproduce or transform structures? In his work on industrial transforma-
tion and structural change, Erik Dahme´n continued and in some ways ”dynamized”
A˚kerman’s notion of structure, through his concept of development blocks (see be-
low). Dahme´n’s work is characterized by a rich underlying ontology of conflict,
complementarities and inertia. Dahme´n operated with a fundamental notion of
industrial transformation and structural change that had ”its center somewhere
between two extreme situations”, a positive situation characterized by opportuni-
ties, and a negative situation characterized by declining demand and a ”strongly
felt necessity to adjust and adapt” (Dahme´n, 1991a, p. 138). In this way, there was
a conflict between new and old ways of doing things. In his doctoral dissertation,
(Dahme´n, 1950) coined the term ’transformation pressure’ to describe the funda-
mental aspects of the industrial transformation process. A positive transformation
pressure characterizes a situation dominated by opportunities, such as opportuni-
ties to increase production or advance or exploit new technologies. Conversely, a
negative transformation pressure characterizes a situation dominated by declining
profits or demand and a felt need for response (Dahme´n, 1991a, 1993).
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Dahme´n’s analysis of industrial transformation aimed to establish bridges be-
tween micro and macro. On the one hand, like A˚kerman, Dahme´n was critical
of Keynesian macroanalyses. Macroanalyses without microfocus miss out on the
variety of underlying microeconomic driving forces, leading to incorrect and even
misleading pictures of the state of the economy, the so-called ”fallacy of aggregative
thinking” (Dahme´n, 1991b, pp. 128-129). On the other hand both A˚kerman and
Dahme´n were critical towards atomism, or methodological individualism, rather
arguing for a symbiosis of micro-, structural and macroanalysis.
Dahme´n’s (1991 [1942]; 1950) major conceptual contribution of ”development
blocks” was a conceptual link between micro and macro that emphasized the
formation of interdependent activities. The development block concept was an
early theoretical contribution to the theory of technological systems, stressing the
systemic character of innovation activity and technological change (for seminal
later contributions see Rosenberg, 1969; Gille, 1978; Hughes, 1987; Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995; Freeman and Louc¸a, 2001; Lipsey et al, 2005). Development
blocks are complementary economic activities that are stimulated by innovations. The
central dynamics of a development block is provided by the fact that new tech-
nologies or innovations require investment and development efforts in other firms
or industries: ”A series of events in entrepreneurial activity, technical development
(including innovations) where the different linkages [...] in one or another mani-
festable way have causal connections with each other or condition each other”
(Dahmen, 1980, p. 50, translated by JT). As it were, innovations create comple-
mentarities, or dependencies between firms, technologies, industries or institutions.
In this process obstacles and imbalances appear that require the alignment of the
technological frontier in other fields, or new innovations that solve technological
problems (cf Rosenberg, 1969; Hughes, 1983; discussed below). Development blocks
are, put in a more involved manner, complementarities that appear sequentially
as agents overcome obstacles or imbalances.7 The Dahme´nian approach crucially
also stresses the inertia present in aligning components of development blocks. The
lack of complementary factors may as it were hamper the development of other
factors. Dahme´n discussed, for instance, the unprofitability of railways during the
late 19th century that were unprofitable until complementary investments in the
railway network had been carried out (Dahme´n, 1991 [1942], p. 30). This relation
was referred to as imbalances or ”structural tensions” (Dahme´n, 1950, p. 70-73;
Dahme´n, 1991 [1942]).
Thus, in Dahme´n’s ontology of structural change there are both positive and
negative factors that provide impetus to industrial transformation and technologi-
cal change. The notion of development blocks can be argued to represent a theory of
endogenous structural change that links micro-behavior (entrepreneurial activity)
to structural and macro-outcomes. Through sequences of complementarities and
structural tensions, structures of economic relations were thus posited to evolve
endogenously as a result of economic choices. While Dahme´n did not formulate a
theory of entrepreneurial activity as endogenous to economic mechanisms, in his
later work (Dahme´n, 1993), he briefly considered a notion of countermeasures to
changes in economic conditions, somewhat similar to Joseph Schumpeter’s notion
7 Dahme´n described the notion of a development block as ”a sequence of complementarities
which by way of a series of structural tensions, i.e., disequilibria, may result in a balanced
situation” (Dahme´n, 1991a, p. 138).
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of creative response (1947). Positive situations, characterized by new opportuni-
ties, would provide powerful incentives towards renewal and towards innovation
as offensive countermeasures. Negative transformation pressure, for instance high
input costs, could induce defensive countermeasures in cost reductions or orga-
nizational rationalization. Other types of negative transformation pressure could
induce offensive countermeasures: ”cases where innovations are induced by a de-
structive threat and thus would not otherwise have been forthcoming” (Dahme´n,
1993, p. 23). These two driving forces were incentives towards transformation in
firms, industries and in development blocks (see Taalbi 2014 for further discussion).
In sum, Dahme´n took A˚kerman’s structural analysis further towards a notion
of structural change in which economic development was itself a factor influenc-
ing industrial transformation, through pressures, opportunities, complementarities
and structural tensions.
2.6 The A˚kerman-Dahme´n framework
In sum, A˚kerman’s structural analysis meant two things: first, observing structural
stability and structural boundaries through analysis of structural indicators and
second, the iterative search and incorporation of driving forces exogenous to the
mechanism under study - the ”ostensibly closed system” in order to understand
structural change. While A˚kerman’s analysis may be argued to have approached
but ultimately underplayed endogenous structural change, Dahme´n’s notion of de-
velopment blocks contains seeds to a notion of structural and technological change
in which the ”free driving forces” are also codetermined within a given structure.
In Dahme´n’s framework of development blocks he sought to explain the inter-
dependencies in the process of economic development and technological change,
studying both the emergence of new structures and sources of structural change.
The underlying ontology makes space for both positive and negative driving forces
of industrial transformation, and stresses both complementarities and imbalances
in the evolution of development blocks. In terms of empirical enquiries, this points
towards the study of positive and negative mechanisms that occasion agents to
respond by innovation.
3 A notion of endogenous structural change
If the goal of structural analysis is the reconstruction of the total situation by
the successive submission of exogenous mechanisms to causal analysis, A˚kerman
and especially Dahme´n came a long way towards an understanding of structural
change which is susceptible to the behavior of micro-agents. Though Dahme´n’s
work contains an ontology of positive and negative interrelations between agents,
he did not himself however present a fuller theory or account of the precise mech-
anisms that underlie endogenous structural change. Let us now pick up the thread
of what is precisely meant with endogenous structural change and how it can be
thought in terms of economic mechanisms. Phrased otherwise: how can one think
structural change as arising within the frames of structure without being trapped
in circular reasoning or tautology?
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3.1 The debate on structure and agency in the social sciences
A lengthy discussion in the social sciences has concerned the relation between
agency and structure, and it is in the attempts to solve this issue that perhaps the
most fruitful notions of structure have emerged. Taking a broader perspective than
economics, in old and recent work, the difference between reductionist and realist
perspectives has tended to be reiterated in discussions on how structure is related
to agency. The issue has to a large extent been dealing with how structures emerge
to begin with, and the co-determination of emergent structures and agency, or if
you will mereology, the relationship between the parts and the whole. Emergence
in its the most encompassing sense, means that the complex interaction between
parts may result in new phenomena at a higher level. The basic emergentist view
can be summarized in that ”The totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the
whole is something besides the parts” (Aristotle Met. Book H, 1045a 8-10). The
main divide in the view on emergence lies between those that view emergence as
a bottom-up relation and nothing more, and those that consider it plausible that
emergent structures also may be endowed with causal effects, implying downward
causation. The first notion is completely compatible with methodological individu-
alism. Economists from Mill (2011 [1843]), von Hayek (1945) to Arrow (1994) and
Krugman (1996) writing more recently, argue that emergent phenomena arise from
the complex interaction between individuals, while holding individualist ontologies
whose dictum may be that of von Hayek: ”neither aggregates nor averages do act
upon one another, and it will never be possible to establish necessary connections
of cause and effect between them as we can between individual phenomena, indi-
vidual prices etc” (von Hayek, 2008 [1931], p. 200). Mill for instance acknowledged
emergence, such as in chemistry or organic ”bodies”, while denying that human
beings could form emergent entities.8 This type of position means that emergence
is an unintended result of intended actions among individuals that however never
becomes endowed with proper causal powers, being ultimately explainable in terms
of individuals or individual behavior. Arrow (1994, p. 3) for instance wrote: ”It is
clear that the individualist perspective does play an essential role in understanding
social phenomena. Particularly striking is the emergent nature of social phenom-
ena, which may be very far from the motives of the individual interactions. It is a
salutary check on any theory of the economy or any other part of society that the
explanations make sense on the basis of the individuals involved.” To von Hayek
(1937, 1945), on this individualist understanding, the free market was an exam-
ple of spontaneous order, an order that emerges from unplanned, decentralized
agency in which agents follow simple behavioral rules. These are all examples of
bottom-up emergence, in which the emergent phenomenon is something besides
its parts, but never obtains proper causal powers. The market is arguably not a
force on its own, it is always reducible to the individual agents that partake in
market transactions.
At the other side of the spectrum we find notions of emergence in which the
emergent structures exhibit downward causation. It would appear that this runs
counter to individualism, but as explained by Agassi (1975), individualism does
8 ”Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with
different properties [...]. Human beings in society have no properties but those which are
derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man” (Mill, 2011
[1843], p. 425).
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not necessarily denying the ontology of structures. ”Institutional individualism”
maintains that while only individuals can have aims and interests, institutional
structures exist and affect individuals’ decisions (Agassi, 1975). In other frame-
works, downward causation appears either as ”soutiens et obstacles” (Braudel,
1958), or as emergent structures determining the character of its parts. The latter
is a type of emergence in which a global phenomenon emerges while at the same
time giving rise to emergent conjugates, new properties among lower level phenom-
ena (De Haan, 2006). This was the main thesis in Althusser and Balibar (1970),
expressed in the principle of ”structural causality”, or Darstellung, what was con-
sidered Marx’s key theoretical revolution, implying the efficacy of structures on
its parts, that ”the structure is immanent in its effects, a cause immanent in its
effects in the Spinozist sense of the term, that the whole existence of the struc-
ture consists of its effects, in short that the structure, which is merely a specific
combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects” (Althusser and
Balibar, 1970, p. 188). Marx’s writings is replete with examples in which the capi-
talist mode of production, commodity exchange or the like is said to determine or
have historically given rise to emergent conjugates: capitalists and workers, labor
value of the individual goods partaking in commodity exchange, and so forth.
Combining the bottom-up emergence and top-down relations between struc-
ture and agency, we also find notions, especially in sociology, that attempt to
formulate agency as afflicting structure and vice versa. There is however a para-
dox, logical contradiction even, in saying that agency ’causes’ structure and that
structure ’causes’ agency (see Hulswit, 2006). Another interpretation can however
be made when it is realized the historicity of structure, as famously expressed by
Marx and Engels: ”Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but
under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past”
(Marx and Engels, 2001 [1885], p. 7). Inspired by Marx, but against more recent
”dialectical” models of the relationship between agency and structure (people and
society)9, Bhaskar (1998 [1979]) stressed this view as a solution to this problem.
He underscored the deep historicity of structure: (social) structures are the histor-
ical products of human agency, being handed down to the present situation as the
result of previous choices. Structure is not created ex nihilo, but agents
”reproduce or transform it. That is, if society is always already made, then
any concrete human praxis, or, if you like, act of objectivation can only
modify it; and the totality of such acts sustain or change it. [...] Society
stands to individuals, then, as something that they never make, but that
exists only in virtue of their activity” (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979], pp. 36-7).
Referring to E´mile Durkheim, Bhaskar similarly stated that it is by their hindering
or enabling effects, that structures can be observed: they ”exist only in virtue of
the activities they govern and cannot be empirically identified independently of
them” (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979], p. 41). In his later work Bhaskar accordingly defined
holistic causality (compare Althusser’s structural causality) as the case when the
totality causally determines the elements and the elements causally codetermine
each other, and so determine or codetermine the whole (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 127).
9 ”People and society are not, I shall argue, related ’dialectically’. They do not constitute
two moments of the same process.” (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979])
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In Bhaskar’s view, emergent structures must be regarded processes in which the
whole and parts are continuously differentiated. Not only the elements, but the
meaning and content of the whole is thus changed, enriched. Structures are then
emergent by virtue of them being reproduced or transformed by social agents and
by their (real) historical influence qua hindering or enabling agency, determining
and creating conjugate properties of its elements. In this way, structures are ar-
guably causal factors as they stand independent of current choices whereas their
evolution is reproduced or transcended by such choices.
3.2 Increasing returns, inertia and imbalances
Bhaskar’s analysis is twice helpful for the aims of this study. It shows that en-
dogenous structural change can be thought without tautology if we are willing
to recognize that structure and agency are not two moments in a simultaneous
process. It also provides tools that can help bring out what is general in Dahme´n’s
mechanisms that underlie development blocks and structural change. Extending
Bhaskar’s suggestion somewhat, I suggest that there are three modes of analy-
sis through which structural change can be explained: the emergence of structure
(M2a), its reproduction (M2b), and transformation (M2c). Some mechanisms un-
derlying these aspects of structural change are obvious in Dahme´n’s framework.
Other, more precise mechanisms can also be found in the more recent literature.
Recognizing the presence of emergent structures in complex systems, economists
and economic historians have during recent decades begun to study mechanisms
that produce structure in complex systems. In particular, attention paid to the
notion of increasing returns (Young, 1928; Kaldor, 1981) has been revealed to pro-
duce profound implications (Arthur et al, 1987; Arthur, 1989, 1990, 1994). In stark
contrast to the standard economic scenario of decreasing returns which eventually
attains a predictable single equilibrium point, increasing returns define multiple
equilibria, among which the equilibrium situation eventually attained will be de-
pendent on the path taken by the system. Increasing returns, positive feedback
mechanisms and positive externalities (e.g. in economic or geographical networks)
are the gist not only of crystallizing structures but of path dependence. Arthur
(1989) discussed technological competition in which the returns to a technology
increase with the rate as its adopted, noting these profound effects: the evolution
of the system ”takes on an evolutionary character, with a ’founder effect’ mech-
anism akin to that in genetics. ’History’ becomes important” (Arthur, 1989, p.
128). As the ”economics of QWERTY” illustrates, the technology that eventually
comes to dominate, needs not be the a priori best one (David, 1985), rather what
counts is a first movers advantage and historical events.
The notion of complementarity, which defines the Dahme´nian ”development
blocks”, could be defined in two movements. It is first of all closely linked to the
notion of increasing returns. A relation of complementarity may be understood as
a positive interdependence between different factors, for instance firms, industries
or factors of production, in which the combination of parts increases the returns or
value of both parts. Thus, following Stieglitz and Heine (2007), complementarity
can be defined as a relation in which the increase in one factor x increases the
return pi of another factor y. The function can be expressed as pi = f(x, y) such that
∂2pi/∂y∂x > 0. However, a relation of complementarity may in a second movement
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be understood as an emergentist interdependence relation; a relation between parts
that produces a totality, which is not only greater than the sum of the parts, but
novel, meaning irreducible to the parts. This notion of complementarity thus links
increasing returns to emergent macro-structures.
Inertia is at the core of explaining the reproduction of structures. In physics,
inertia implies the amount of resistance of objects to a change in its state of
motion. In economics ”inertia” may be said to lie in the feasibility of changing a
fact. The path dependent nature of structures, historical facts, explains in part
why they tend to be reproduced. Once decisions have become facts, investments
or in other ways materialized, it is often manifestly unprofitable, costly, inefficient
or risky for agents to make changes. Uncertainty, is in itself a deep cause for inert
or routinized behavior, closely linked to path dependence (see below). What is
more, complementarities between structures add another dimension to the issue of
reproduction. Traditions and routines (Braudel, 1958; see also Nelson and Winter,
1982), informal and formal rules (North, 1991) are themselves ”structures” that not
only solve the fundamental uncertainty inherent in economic exchange, but may
reinforce other structures. To Althusser, the reproduction of the capitalist mode
of production was governed by the superstructure, ideology, and the ideological
apparatus. To Gramsci, the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production
was aided by hegemony. Like the cross-linking of polymer chains in vulcanization
processes create more durable materials, mutually reinforcing structures may work
as strong factors behind the reproduction of an overall structure.
What then drives agents to transform structures? In a very generic sense,
conflict appears to be the common denominator to those accounts that describe
endogenous driving forces to (structural) transformation. In Dahme´n’s framework
this emerges as ”transformation pressure” or imbalances. Several students of tech-
nology have also pointed to that problems and imbalances may be systemic in
character: lack of complementarities and technological imbalances spur and mo-
tivate ”gap filling” innovations (Rosenberg, 1969; Hughes, 1983). Nathan Rosen-
berg (1969) noted that ”The history of technology is replete with examples of the
beneficent effects of this sort of imbalance as an inducement for further innovation”
(Rosenberg, 1969, p. 10). A very similar view has been offered by Thomas Hughes’
(1983; 1987) analysis of ’sociotechnical systems’ that evolve through the emergence
of ’salients’ and ’reverse salients’. Reverse salients are backwards, underperform-
ing components of the sociotechnical system, that hamper the development of
the sociotechnical system as a whole. Such mechanisms are also easily found in
other frameworks that center on explaining changes in various kinds of structure.
In Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the dominating mode of change
in paradigms lies in a conflict between scientific expectations and results, which
is resolved by way of exploration: ”Discovery commences with the awareness of
anomaly, i.e. with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-
induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more
or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the
paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the ex-
pected” (Kuhn, 2012 [1962], p. 52–53). Similarly, in the view of Cyert and March
(1963), problems, such as unsatisfactory technological or economic performance or
intra-firm conflicts between antagonistic groups, would stimulate search for better
products and processes. These and similar reasonings have been applied to social
conflicts such as strikes, frequently linked to crises, wage reductions and discontent
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Table 1 Summary of structural phases and endogenous mechanisms
Structural
phase
Endogenous mech-
anisms
Emergence
(M2a)
Complementarity,
increasing returns
Reproduction
(M2b)
Inertia, sunk costs,
traditions, rou-
tines, increasing
returns, comple-
mentarity
Transformation
(M2c)
Conflict, imbal-
ances, incomplete-
ness, absence
spurred by problems in the work environment, unemployment, or welfare cuts (see
theories of relative deprivation, e.g. Davies, 1962).
Conflict, the absence of complementarity, imbalances, imperfections, or onto-
logical absence form then a real basis of a dialectic that drives endogenous struc-
tural change. While creative responses to such imbalances or absences could well
be teleological (in the sense intentional) from the point of view of agents, it must
be considered teleonomic from the point of view of the whole, since there is no
umpire or planner that organizes the evolutionary process of discovery.
If such contradictions occur at the structural level, the structure may be said
to have entered into diminishing returns. Such endogenously generated decline of
structures are present in both Marxian and Schumpeterian thinking. The Marxian
analysis of the capitalist mode of production sought out internal contradictions.
With respect to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, Marx argued that ”Cap-
italist production constantly strives to overcome these immanent barriers, but it
overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers afresh and on a more
powerful scale” and hence ”The true barrier to capitalist production is capital
itself ”(Marx, 1991 [1894], p. 358). To Marx the contradiction both motivated
technological change (which, being labor-biased however would accentuate the
contradictions) and the eventual demise of capitalism. In Schumpeterian models
of industry life cycles, diminishing returns arise from standardization of products,
intensified competition and the exploitation and exhaustion of technological oppor-
tunities (see e.g. Gort and Klepper, 1982). Schumpeterian theories of technological
change, and some Marxist theories of capitalism (e.g. Mandel, 1975) are in general
open towards the possibility that structural decline may be suspended, but the
underlying factors are exogenous or ”semi-autonomous”.
3.3 Endogenous structural change and emergence of macro-structure - a
mathematical illlustration
I will conclude this discussion by illustrating an alternate way of thinking structure
and endogenous structural change. The mechanisms underlying structural change,
found in Dahme´n’s framework and in the previous review, are summarized in Table
1. The Table indicates at once three modes of the analysis of endogenous structural
change.
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Most of these mechanisms and the notions of structure and structural change
can be illustrated in a basic game-like framework. with agents a ∈ (1, 2, ..., N),
a set of alternatives A and choices k ∈ (1, 2, ..,K), k ∈ A. Define the number of
agents choosing alternative k as Nk (where
∑
kNk = N) and a payoff function pik
at time t. Agents are for simplicity assumed to follow satisficing behavioral rules,
i.e. agents evaluate payoffs for a current choice k and{
choose k if pik ≥ L
move to j ∈ A with probability Pkj if pik < L
(1)
This equation specifies the conditions of stability and change of choices, and by
extention the conditions of reproduction and transformation of structures. In this
framework the behavior of the system is determined by two facets: 1) the pay-
off function, which determines what choices are profitable given the set of other
choices, and 2) the transition probabilities between choices, i.e. the possibility that
certain alternatives are unknown and/or improbable to reach from certain sets of
choices. Clearly, the transition probabilities open up the possibility of path de-
pendence (Arthur et al, 1987). Moreover, the notion that some alternatives are
unknown and must be discovered is the basis of a evolutionary process in which
novelty may result from the exploration of the space of choices. At this juncture, I
will however restrict the discussion only to the specification of the pay-off function.
Payoffs are a function of the number of agents Nk choosing option k. In a
simultaneous interdependent system the payoffs are modelled as linear functions
of Nk according to 
pi1
pi2
...
piK
 =

β11 β12 . . . β1K
β21 β22 . . . β2K
...
...
. . .
...
βK1 βK2 . . . βKK
×

N1
N2
...
NK
 (2)
where βkj ∈ R and for k = j, βkj ≤ 0. The later assumption is due to that agents
making the same choices compete for payoffs.
By contrast in a historically evolving system, payoffs evolve depending on the
choices of agents. In order to introduce such an impact consider as an example a
system in which the evolving payoff function of choosing an option k is
pikt = B×
∑t
t=0 α
tNkt∑t
t=0 α
tNt
(3)
and where B is again a K × K matrix of coefficients βkj and 0 < α < 1 is a
parameter stating the dependence of past choices. It is possible to rewrite the
system to
pikt = B×
(
αNkt
N
+
∑t−1
0
(
αt+1Nkt
)
N
)
(4)
Thus payoffs are a weighted sum of the share of agents having chosen at some
point in time the option k. Thus payoffs are dependent on both current and previ-
ous choices. Unlike the simultaneous model, the path of choices previously made
determines which choices are ”profitable” (or not) at time t. Or, if you will, the
”causal efficacy” of structure is observed in the influence of historical choices on
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Fig. 1 Illustration of two structures (ℵ and i) in a graph Γ with edges E as pairs of vertices
(m,n) ∈ E such that ∂pim∈A
∂Nn∈A
> 0 or
∂pin∈A
∂Nm∈A
> 0 .
i6
i3
i2i1
i7ℵ1
ℵ2
i5
ℵ3
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nodes for which pi ≥ L
nodes for which pi < L
ℵ
i
Note: Edges and dashed edges denote positive and negative values respectively.
the current set of profitable choices. Thus, the historicity of the system provides
”support” or ”obstacles” for certain choices.
Thus our system consists of a behavioral rule for the reproduction or change of
current choices (eq. 1) and a function (eq. 2 and eq. 4) in which choices (current or
previous) determine the payoffs. Using this particular framework I advance that
a structure can be defined in general as a subset of choices S ⊂ A, for which two
criteria hold. First, all the parts of the structure are connected in terms of positive
interrelations. In our case, we may discern such sets in the graph of
∂piµ∈S
∂Nν∈S (i.e. βµν
in eq. 2 and αN βµν in eq. 4). By connectedness it is here implied that in a network
of positive relations, regardless of direction, any vertex µ ∈ S can be reached from
any other vertex ν ∈ S. Formally, define the edges E of a graph as pairs of vertices
(m,n) ∈ E such that ∂pim∈A∂Nn∈A > 0 or
∂pin∈A
∂Nm∈A > 0. A structure is then connected if
for any two vertices µ and ν in S, there is a path from µ to ν. Second, the choices
within the structure are profitable:
∀µ∈S , piµ∈S ≥ L (5)
Observe that this definition allows both positive and negative interrelations be-
tween parts of the structure, and hence potential instability. A structure is thus a
(potentially) stable set of choices, ranging from equilibrium positions to temporar-
ily stable sets of choices that are slowly counteracted by negative interrelations. In
general, equilibrium positions are positions N∗µ such that ∀µ∈S ,piµ ≥ L and ∀µ∈S ,
∆piµ ≥ 0. Conversely, undermined positions of stability are positions such that
∀µ∈S ,piµ ≥ L and ∀µ∈S , ∆piµ < 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed notion of structure in an undirected graph
with adjacency matrix
∂piµ∈S
∂Nν∈S , assumed symmetric for simplicity. The example
shows two sets of vertices ℵ and i for which the nodes involved pay-offs above
aspiration levels (pi ≥ L) are connected in terms of positive inter-relations (edges).
ℵ has only positive interactions. Consequently, structural breaks can only occur
in terms of relations to the vertices outside of ℵ. By contrast, the structure could
possibly be undermined by the negative relations within i.
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Fig. 2 Simulation with endogenous structural instability and episodes of crisis.
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It is clear that in eq. 4 the matrix of parameters B determines the prevalence
of stable and unstable structures, together with the history of the system. Now, it
is possible to understand the system in terms of the found underlying assumptions
about the interrelations between agents in terms of complementarities or increasing
returns and conflict or imbalances, summarized in Table 2. Three types of relations
between choices are possible to discern in considering the elements of the Jacobian
of the payoff function ∇kj = ∂pik∂Nj , which in the first simultaneous systems is
equal to B and equal to αNB in the evolving system. Complementarities between
two choices exist if for two choices k and j, ∂pik∂Nj > 0 and
∂pij
∂Nk
> 0. A rivalrous
relation between two choices k and j exist if ∂pik∂Nj < 0 and
∂pij
∂Nk
< 0. For the cases
when k = j, these relations are equivalent to increasing and decreasing returns
respectively. Finally, ”exploitative relations” are enabled if for two choices k and
j, ∂pik∂Nj > 0 and
∂pij
∂Nk
< 0.
Thus complementarities, exploitative and rivalrous relations can be defined re-
spectively as relations that mutually enhance payoffs, benefits one at the expense
of the other and mutually decrease payoffs. Clearly, complementary choices enable
structure, as defined in eq. 5, to emerge, while rivalrous relations undermine struc-
tures. Exploitative relations may reproduce or undermine a structure, depending
on the state of the system.
A core point here is that in the simultaneous system (eq. 2), such relations
exist simultaneously but will not interfere with the structure once it is attained,
since by definition payoffs only change when choices change: ∆pik = B×∆Nk. By
contrast, in the historically evolving system (eq. 4) the level of payoffs may be
sufficient for agents to continue to reproduce the system, while payoffs decrease as
a consequence of historical choices. Macro-structure may thus emerge, but it may
be inherently stable or unstable, depending on the state of the system. Figure 2
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shows a simulation of the system described by eq. 4, in which the system tends
towards the emergence of macro-structure but due to a prevalence of negative
relations is intermittently undermined by rivalrous and/or exploitative relations
leading to structural crises and restructuring towards choices with payoffs pi ≥ L.
4 The four modes of causal-structural analysis. Summary
Recent attempts to understand structural change as endogenous to economic mech-
anisms challenge the traditional division of labor between economics and economic
history. This challenge calls for approaches to integrate economics and economic
history, i.e. causal and structural analysis. This paper has aimed to expound how
the notion of endogenous structural change is thought and can be thought in terms
of underlying mechanisms in order to aid empirical analysis of evolving structures.
By surveying a broad literature, I believe to have arrived at some suggestions
of how causal analysis and structural analysis can be integrated and how struc-
tural change can be understood and studied empirically in terms of a set of basic
mechanisms.
On the conceptual level, this paper has shown that the ostensible paradox in
thinking endogenous structural change stems from notions which are inherently
ahistorical (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]). When history is introduced, in our particular
model when payoffs evolve as a result of choices, endogenous stability as well as
endogenously generated crises and instability is possible. Positive and negative re-
lations among micro-agents underpin three facets of structural change: emergence,
reproduction and transformation. These relations, specified by Dahme´n and in
contributions in evolutionary economics, economics of complexity and Marxian
theories, among others, substantiate notions of endogenous structural change, and
point to areas of possible empirical observation of economic structures and struc-
tural change.
The issue facing empirical research is how to analyse and register mechanisms
underlying the emergence, reproduction and eventual decline of structures. This
paper has found four modes of structural analysis which can be connected with
causal analysis of economic phenomena. The causal-structural analysis is then
a description of not only stable causal mechanisms, but also a description of the
interrelations between a potentially evolving causal mechanism and structure. The
first mode (M1) is to determine the structural boundaries, i.e. the observation of
structural stability. In A˚kerman’s research, periods of structural stability could
be studied by using structural indicators. In Swedish economic historical research,
structural analysis along the lines of A˚kerman has first and foremost been carried
out by way of analysis of the temporal boundaries of structures through the use
of macro-oriented ”structural indicators”, such as the investment ratio, the wage
share or the Gerschenkron index.
In a second mode of analysis (M2), structural change is understood through
causal analysis of the driving forces of structural change, incorporating them into
the framework. This mode has three analytical facets that link causal mechanisms
to structural change: how new structures emerge as a result of economic behavior
(M2a) and how agency reproduces (M2b) or transcends existing structures (M2c).
These modes of analysis stresses the study of the relationship between micro and
macro. Dahme´n’s notion of development blocks extended A˚kerman’s structural
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analysis by providing several key mechanisms underlying industrial transforma-
tion and structural change, making possible a conception of structural change not
merely being exogenously imposed but also being the endogenous result of micro-
behavior: ”The microanalysis must thus aim for a macro-picture, i.e. it must com-
prise the influence of the microunits on their environment” (Dahmen, 1980, p. 38,
translation by the author). Similarly, one may add, an integration of causal and
structural analysis requires econometric or qualitative analysis of economic mech-
anisms to explicitly comprise their influence on their (structural) environment.
Dahme´n’s theory of industrial transformation and his concept of development
blocks thus suggest that macro-studies of structural change can be complemented
by a more micro-oriented approach.10
It is here thus suggested that structural analysis, in general, may be carried
out by observing structural stability and change establishing structural boundaries
through the analysis of structural indicators (M1) and through the empirical anal-
ysis of underlying micro-mechanisms (M2a, 2b and 2c). The reviewed mechanisms
previously summarized in Table 1 summarize the positive factors that underlie
the emergence of structure, the inert factors that underlie the reproduction of
structures, and the negative factors that underlie the transformation, or continued
evolution of macro-structure.
It seems first of all to be through the study of complementarities and increasing
returns that we may study the emergence and reproduction of economic, techno-
logical or other structures. Empirical studies of relations of complementarity are
however difficult to conduct due to the evasive nature of complementary relations
in complex systems. Clearly, such studies not only require an adequate grasp of
the interdependence between choices of micro-agents but also the character of
such interdependencies. As regards innovation studies, it seems that up until now
the most viable path for empirical research consists in qualitative case studies.
However, provided that positive interdependencies can be properly assessed, net-
work analysis of interdependencies between e.g. industries, technologies, patents
or innovations is a viable alternative to assess systematic interdependencies.
A principal factor underlying the reproduction of structure is also the inertia,
by which in economic contexts is often understood quasi-irreversible investment,
locally increasing returns, or sunk investment, a historically given fact, which by
itself makes changes to the current state of affairs implausible, unprofitable or
perhaps manifestly absurd. These are historical mechanisms that underlie the re-
production of structure, and, potentially create obstacles or disincentives to the
transition from one societal, economic or institutional arrangement to another.
With their source in fundamental uncertainty, routine, traditions and other types
of informal institutions have in the history of mankind played a manifest role in
e.g. creating stable forms of economic exchange, but are also a sources of iner-
tia and resistance to change (Braudel, 1958; North, 1991). These mechanisms are
also probably best studied in terms of micro-oriented analysis, be it qualitative
or quantitative, asking the question: under what circumstances do agents repro-
duce the states of affairs? This is at once, possibly, a question of studying the
”causal efficacy” of structures through the mechanisms by which structure tends
10 In this tradition of thought, Scho¨n (1994, 1998, 2010) integrated the analysis of structural
indicators with a historical analysis of the driving forces of transformation and the implications
of economic crises, thereby establishing structural boundaries and a historical generalization
of the rhythm of technological change and industrial transformation in development blocks.
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to reproduced. In the mathematical illustration given previously, such inertia was
introduced through an impact of historical choices on payoffs, either in terms of
increasing returns or complementarities between choices, thus increasing the ”prof-
itability” of certain choices, or in terms of making other choices ”unprofitable”.
Lastly, it seems to be by the study of imbalances and conflicts that we may
find endogenous driving forces of structural change: in innovation systems, labor
market relations, institutions, scientific paradigms and so forth. Again, micro-
oriented studies of response to imbalances, conflicts and problems are likely to
be rewarded with improved understanding of the mechanisms behind structural
breaks, crisis and how alternatives to present orders of things emerge.
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